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Introduction
“Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too 
abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that 
they do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language 
to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective 
assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social 
field. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic 
chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, 
sciences, and social struggles.” (Deleuze et al . 1987: 8)
“Even if music is said to be a universal language, the resistance 
to a foreign-language lyric could be overcome easier with beauty 
standards and dance routines of the prevailing global norm. MTV of 
course had appeared as early as 1981, but it nonetheless remained 
tethered to the music industry and its networks and practices (…) 
Given the strong inflection of English lyric, it is difficult to decipher 
from listening just briefly whether the song is in Korean or any other 
language.” (Lie 2012: 356)
Conceptual framework
In the contemporary world of screens, content freely penetrates barriers, 
negotiating the elimination of the boundaries of nations, ideologies, and 
even language, the most stubborn and, possibly, the last boundary that 
remains within human society. Employing screen-based communications 
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characterised by a more affective and sensory co-experience, the linguistic 
exchanges in this new era of the screen demonstrate an inclination toward 
transcending a variety of barriers, including language barriers. More than 35 
years ago, Benedict Anderson noted that the “fatality of human linguistic 
diversity” in print-capitalism has contributed to the “artefacts” of “nation” 
(Anderson 1983). This “fatality” can be understood as resulting from the 
inherent gaps that occur when different linguistic registers collide. The pop 
culture fad known as the Korean Wave (hallyu) was firstly recognised and 
widely disseminated in the Sinophone world over the last two decades. 
Chinese television and entertainment sectors roll out a myriad of remakes 
of Korean television programs, which have become a new pattern of hallyu 
– transformed from an imported culture to a collaborative, incorporative, 
and interlaced set of projects – in mainland China within the context of 
bilateral tensions. Nothing is better positioned to exemplify the quotidian 
exchanges than the influence of Korean musical television programs, through 
which Chinese audiences’ lives cross linguistic and ideological boundaries 
via a screen media form. Scholars have discussed the cultural hybridisation 
thesis in the context of the globalisation of K-pop and of Korean popular 
culture in general (Shim 2006; Ryoo 2009; Jin and Ryoo 2014; Lee 2017; Yoon 
2018). Scholarship has also foregrounded how K-pop is institutionalised 
to serve national branding in the interest of building Korea’s soft power 
(Lie 2014; Choi 2015). Others have centred their inquiries on the “idols” of 
* Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Korea Foundation Fellowship for Graduate 
Studies (Ref. 1022000-1178). I am thankful to Professor Jerry Won Lee, whose comments and 
suggestions on the earlier draft added value to this paper.
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K-pop, including the problematics of commercialisation and gender, either 
lambasting the “syndrome of girl idols,” referring to the spectacularisation 
and commercialisation of girl idols’ bodies, or on the versatile manufacture 
of boy idols’ masculinity to be Asianized or globally marketable (Shin 2009; 
Lee 2009; Kim 2010; Kim 2011; Jung 2011). 
On the Chinese side, scholarship on the politics of media culture has 
noted government authorities’ strategic management of popular music 
conducive to “national ideologies,” nationalist agendas, or “Chineseness” (Ho 
2006; Fung 2007; Chow 2010). Ho and Law (2012) discussed how the state 
uses traditional Chinese culture to legitimise its authority. Much has also 
been written about political parodies and entertainment-masked democracy 
or “democratic entertainment” commodities in China (Jian and Liu 2009). 
Among other studies, Wu and Wang showed that the haixuan (海選, village 
election) and PK (Player Killing) in the Chinese musical competition show 
Super Girls recaptured a sense of democracy “in response to young people’s 
desire, commodified daily experience and the invisible trajectory of crying 
that we could own as basic individual rights.” (2008: 417). Although the 
term hallyu was coined in the Sinophone context, cultural entanglements 
between Korean and Chinese popular music have received little attention 
in English-language academic publications. This article examines the 
politics of language and affect in Korean pop music’s spread within the 
Sinophone musical world. More specifically, it centres on the question of 
how K-Pop phenomena have crossed borders and have been (re)produced, 
and how these shows reflect and simultaneously are shaped by audiences’ 
new aesthetic sensibilities in the context of their interplay with affective 
negotiation, in response to increasing demands originating from screen 
culture’s travel across borders.
Research methods
This research has been done through a critical examination of the Chinese 
remake of the Korean television reality program I Am a Singer. It does so by 
analysing the content and visual-audio aspects of the program, conducting 
fieldwork in South Korea on the Chinese-Korean audiences’ interactions on 
and off screen, studying online and in-studio audiences’ reactions to the 
program, and engaging critical theories to explore a new analytical concept 
in understanding cultural and affective entanglements in a time in which 
screen culture thrives. In this paper, I will explore questions of how the show 
performs and represents the newly rising aesthetic demands of what I term the 
“lingualscape,” and in particular, how it interplays with affective negotiation 
in the practices of translation or transplantation within the context of 
cultural de-territorialisation. Arjun Appadurai’s framework of fluid ethnoscape, 
technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape sheds light on the 
understanding of the global cultural flows (Appadurai 1996). In these processes 
of de-territorialisation, however, the concept of a shifting lingualscape is 
absent. I conceptualise the lingualscape as the shifting landscape of languages 
intermingled with and liberated from standardised national languages 
through which people communicate at both affective and enunciative 
levels. I argue that the shifting lingualscape in this Sino-Korean musical TV 
program demonstrates nonethnic-centred imaginings across national and 
state-sanctioned ideological boundaries. The lingualscape performs affective 
negotiation within nation-state official narratives and rises above the official 
lingual system, a process through which sincere communication becomes 
possible in a digital time. Critical examination of the interplay between the 
shifting lingualscape and affective negotiation outside of state-sanctioned 
official languages foregrounds not only new perspectives on the relationship 
between China and Korea, but more broadly, an understanding of connecting 
audiences free from the cohesive violence of language.
Lingualscape and re-compositions
I Am a Singer is a Chinese musical TV show remade from a Korean program 
of the same name. It debuted on 18 January 2013, close to the Lunar New 
Year, and viewers have watched it every Friday night since then. This broadcast 
time has made the show one of the New Year activities among Chinese 
audiences across different generations. The program has been one of the 
most popular reality TV shows in mainland China for the past five years. The 
provincial satellite station Hunan TV imported I Am a Singer from the Korean 
MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation), and its first season was produced 
as a Sino-Korean collaboration. In addition to being broadcast by Hunan TV, 
the show is also available in Taiwan from GTV and GTV Variety Show; in Hong 
Kong from Now Mango, TVB (Television Broadcasts Limited) Jade, and J5 
(TVB Finance Channel); and in Malaysia from Astro Quanjia HD. I Am a Singer 
departs from previous shows such as Super Girls in that instead of entire 
Chinese audiences sitting in front of the TV voting on the competition, only 
a select 500-member audience – consisting of individuals of different ages, 
genders, and occupations – who are present at the show have the right to 
vote to eliminate one of the seven singers after each week’s competition. The 
competition rules are from its Korean original version. The new competition 
mechanism has given the show the tone of an apolitical, transnational, and 
translingual game. In such a game, audiences’ emotional participation, which 
had previously been interpreted as the realisation of individual rights, has 
shifted into a collective manifestation seeking transnational cultural, lingual, 
financial, and emotional exchanges.
John Lie once noted about K-pop, “[G]iven the strong inflection of English 
lyric, it is difficult to decipher from listening just briefly whether the song is in 
Korean or any other language” (2012: 356). This blurriness in Korean popular 
music is a strategic move: it is constructed by the social and aesthetic desire 
for a fluid lingualscape. The interplay between a shifting lingualscape and 
affective interactions implies an aspiration for communication outside of 
the state-sanctioned official languages. This negotiation is embedded within 
the context of Sino-Korean interactions of musical television programs. 
These cross-border interactions are structured by the logic of negotiating, 
penetrating, and eliminating boundaries by the affective medium of the 
screen, accompanied by the capitalist logic of self-expansion. Screen culture 
proliferates, expands, and imagines a de-territorialised/re-territorialised zone 
in the general public’s daily life. In these processes of de-territorialisation, the 
desire for eliminating language barriers is well reflected in the exchanges of 
musical television programs, a media form driven by a combination of screen 
culture’s proliferation, capitalist market expansion, television’s emphasis on 
the general public’s everydayness, and musical interactions bound to affective 
exchanges and reflective of liberation from official languages. 
The remake of I Am a Singer invited the winner from its Korean original 
version to perform in the third season (2015), a technique that is commonly 
used in other Chinese remakes of Korean TV shows. The Korean singer known 
as “The One” (정 순 원) sang the theme songs of many popular K-dramas, 
such as All About Eve, Only You, Princess Hours, That Winter the Wind Blows, 
and Famous Child Princesses, and garnered warm praise from Chinese and 
other Asian audiences. It is worth mentioning at this point that the popularity 
of K-drama outside of South Korea has laid the groundwork for cultivating 
overseas fandom and developing affective empathy among audiences. Some 
of the in-studio audience members are drawn from this international fan base. 
39N o .  2 0 1 9 / 3  •  china p e r s p e c t i v e s
Hunan TV, famous for being an entertainment hub among other TV channels 
in mainland China, had also imported Only You and Famous Child Princesses 
to China. Hunan TV had already aired these shows, so when The One 
appeared on I Am a Singer, the songs were already popular among viewers. In 
the third season of I Am a Singer, The One’s trilingual (Chinese, Korean, and 
English) performance of My Destiny, the theme song of the hit K-drama My 
Love from the Star, drew a standing ovation and enthusiastic cheers from the 
audience. His bilingual (Chinese and Korean) performance of the song That 
Man, the theme song of another hit K-drama, Secret Garden, earned him the 
position of champion for that week. The performance of the same song in the 
original Korean show has also drawn Korean audiences’ warm applause for its 
emotional resonance. His emotional stage and rendition of Secret Garden’s 
moving soundtrack in the Chinese I Am a Singer were covered by Koreaboo, 
a digital media across multiple platforms that shares viral Korean pop culture 
in English to audience from all around world, drawing Korean audience’s 
attention to this performance in connecting with his Chinese fandom and 
beyond: “[K]nown by many fans as Girls’ Generation’s Taeyeon’s vocal coach, 
The One impressed Chinese audiences with his powerful performance of ‘That 
Man.’ He sang the first half of the song in Chinese, revealing his language 
flexibility, before transitioning to the original Korean lyrics.”1 His performance 
of the Chinese remake went viral on various online platforms among Chinese 
and Korean audience, including on YouTube, to which access is not officially 
granted in China, while an affective and interactive fandom community has 
been forged. Audiences from around the globe, in difference languages, left 
comments free of ethnic and linguistic boundaries such as, “[I] feel this is very 
touching although there are words that I don’t understand,” “Why is there a 
need to differentiate nationality, isn’t it good enough to just enjoy the song?,” 
“I’m so excited just because of his voice,” “My tears run down when singing 
along with him,” and “Language doesn't matter, just believe in your ears.”2 
What our ears and eyes capture are not merely about language or ethnicity. 
In these interactive online appraisals, sensorial co-experience is highly stressed 
while standardised national languages are played down. Prior to performing 
in the Chinese remake, The One had twice been the champion in the Korean 
version of I Am a Singer  and co-performed as a guest with the Chinese 
singer Huang Qishan in the final show of the first season of the Chinese 
remake in 2013 (Figure 1). The connections between the original show and 
the remake were underscored by this co-performance, which featured the 
song “Without You.” The lyrics of the song, “I can’t live, the living without 
you,” not only imply the intertextual survival of the cultural flows but also 
reveal unavoidable de-territorialisation. The increasing mobility and fluidity 
of transnational cultural (co)production and (co)consumption have been (re)
shaping the “territory” of each nation from a myriad of dimensions. 
In such a context, Appadurai’s theory on the de-territorialisation of the 
world landscape offers a closely bounded transnationalism rather than a space 
defined by national borders. Appadurai constructs a framework for global 
cultural flows, which he loosely defines with the categories ethnoscape, 
technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape. As Appadurai 
explains, the usage of the suffix “-scape” indicates “the fluid and irregular 
shapes of these landscapes” (1996: 28). This framework provides a heuristic 
device for reading the Sino-Korean relationship at the intersection of media, 
ideology, ethnicity, economy, and technology. Ethnoscape, defined as “the 
landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live” 
(ibid.: 33), refers to the intensified movement of people across borders. In the 
case of Sino-Korean interactions, for instance, it is well known that Chinese 
tourists make up the largest portion of overseas visitors in South Korea; less 
discussed and perhaps unexpected, however, is the fact that South Koreans 
are also the largest subsection of overseas visitors to the PRC.3 Tourism and 
the increasing Sino-Korean co-productions in visual media strongly suggest 
that onscreen worlds, which spark the spectators’ imagination, can lead to 
offscreen interactions in their everyday lives. In turn, these imaginings have 
been shaped and intensified by the participants’ engaged practices on and 
off screen. In such a process, it is not difficult at all to imagine the interplay 
between ethnoscape and other “scapes,” including lingualscape. We would 
be reductive to make ethnoscape equal to lingualscape, as the visual-aural 
communication and affective interactions traversing screen and actuality 
are not taken into consideration, not to mention that ethnic identity does 
not always suggest one’s national identity or usage of a certain language 
(i.e., there are 56 ethnic groups in China, including the Korean ethnic group, 
in the case of Sino-Korean interactions). And the emphasis on the semantic 
statement and micropolitics of lingualscape signals a significant departure 
from the mediascape. Each deterritorialising “scape” cannot be fully 
understood without first placing itself in an intersectional framework where 
each “scape” interacts with other “-scapes.” 
Combining the growing influence of the shifting mediascape and 
technoscape, Korean TV shows have created a new disjuncture between 
what Appadurai calls “spatial and virtual neighbourhoods” (ibid.: 189). These 
“neighbours” are given access to each other through the projection of their 
similar imaginations about daily trivialities onto the screen. As individuals 
and yet collectively, virtual neighbours actively engage in the activity 
that contributes to the ever changing financescape, technoscape, and 
mediascape. Such activity, and the changes it shapes, takes place within the 
dynamics of juxtaposing affinity and resistance between Korea and China. 
In return, the Chinese mediascape has been reshaped along with the shifting 
ethnoscape by placing Korean singers on the stage of the Chinese remake. 
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1. “The One takes first with ‘That Man’ on China’s ‘I Am A Singer 3,’” Koreaboo, 17 February 2015: 
https://www.koreaboo.com/video/one-takes-first-man-chinas-singer-3/ (accessed on 18 July 
2018).
2. See, for instance, the great number of views and active communication among audiences, in 
different languages, across from China, Korea, and beyond, on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bFLyXDKii7E (accessed on 18 July 2019). Also see Korean audiences’ online appraisals of 
Chinese remake I Am a Singer, which are translated into Chinese: Hujiang Korean, 29 January 2013, 
https://kr.hujiang.com/new/p447502/ (accessed on 20 July 2019).
3.  Data on Korean international tourists collected from Korean Tourism Organization, https://kto.
visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto (accessed on 25 June 
2017). Thanks to Lynn at Hallyu Experience Office, a marketing agency of Seoul Metropolitan 
Government, who generously provided me with suggestions and access to obtain data regarding 
tourism during my field research in Seoul in June 2017. Data on international tourists in China is 
from China Tourism Academy’s Annual Report of China Inbound Tourism Development 2017. Also 
see the report in People’s Daily Overseas Edition, 18 October 2017, http://finance.sina.com.cn/
chanjing/cyxw/2017-10-18/doc-ifymviyp2125936.shtml (accessed on 20 November 2017).
Figure 1. Korean singer The One and Chinese singer Huang Qishan’s co-performance of “Without 
you” in I Am a Singer. Photo from Chinese remake I Am a Singer, season 1, episode 13, 12 April 2013. 
Screenshot provided by the author.
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Collaborating with Korean partners and learning from the Korean production 
technologies and methodologies of musical programs has reformed the 
mediascape and technoscape on the Chinese scene. 
These re-compositions in diverse sectors interconnect with the flowing 
financescape. In recognition of the success of casting Korean singer The One 
in the third season, the Chinese remake of I Am a Singer cast another Korean 
singer, Hwang Ch’iyõl (황치열), in its fourth season in 2016.4 After singing 
popular theme songs such as “You Are My Everything” from the hit K-drama 
Descendants of the Sun, the Chinese song “Bitter Sea,” and “An Oath of 
One’s Own,” among others, Hwang’s fandom rapidly grew, numbering five 
million Chinese fans on the most popular Chinese social media platform, 
Weibo. His name promptly went viral after the previous nine years of 
relative silence in pop music, both in Korea and China. This rising popularity 
enabled him to achieve huge success in new album sales; the booking fees 
for his musical performances skyrocketed. According to the Korean Gaon 
Record Chart’s investigation, the sales of his newly-issued mini album Be 
Ordinary reached more than 220,000 copies, making him the highest-selling 
soloist in 2017, surpassing the record of all solo artists in the last four years.5 
His booking fee soared to 1,670,000 RMB, which is 100 times the price 
in South Korea.6 His success and influence capitalised on his exposure to 
audiences via the screen and has consequently (re)shaped the Sino-Korean 
financescape, standing as one of the most representative examples of scape-
morphing embodiment and a border-crossing beneficiary in this new pattern 
of hallyu remakes. 
The interactions between all these fluid -scapes reshape not only post-
national identities but also the relationship between China and Korea. 
The interconnections create bonds between Korea and China that afford 
an alternative to Western-centric hegemonic transculturation. The shifts 
of the lingualscape in the Sino-Korean context are also seen in hybridised 
forms of national culture. Hybridity has been suggested as an explanation 
for the success of hallyu . Doobo Shim points out that hybridity has 
become a field of struggle when Korean culture started to be confronted 
with global cultural domination in the era of globalisation (2006). This 
hybridity is a negotiation between a minority culture, which seeks 
cultural expansion, and mainstream global cultural hegemony. Gerardo 
Mosquera also argues that experiences of hybridity, appropriation, and re-
semanticisation gain power in the increasing interactions among cultures 
(2012). Grounded within hybridised forms, the merging of and connections 
between Korean and Chinese television programs have strengthened both 
sides’ competitiveness in the television industries within and beyond their 
domestic audiences, forming a transnational spectatorship that is not 
dominated by the West. 
Constant de-territorialisation has already made “Chineseness” or 
“Koreanness” hybridised notions, rendering baseless the claim to either 
ethnic-centred culture. We live in “a great time of hybrids,” as the Mexican 
rock star Rockdrigo sang (quoted in Mosquera 2012). Hybridity indeed 
empowers the spread of both the Korean original show and its Chinese 
remake. This “time of hybrids,” however, also suggests that the theory of 
hybridity is not unique to Korean culture, of course, and so a particularistic 
reading lacks intellectual layers to understand the cultural phenomenon. 
Still, hybridity is a fundamental context and should be the starting point 
for our studies of Korea, of China, and of transnationality. More important 
questions emerge within this context: what sorts of hybridity are there to 
make a difference in our daily lives? In what modes and how would the 
intermingling account for the ways we view and communicate with each 
other within the context of parallel tensions of official narratives? 
Affective negotiation 
The lingualscape performs an affective negotiation outside of 
state-sanctioned lingual systems, which facilitates a non-politicised 
communication among the general public. This adds a layer to the 
hybridisation discussed previously. The boundary-blurring multilingual lyrics 
featured on I Am a Singer are far less about “accurate” communication in 
a standard language than they are about affective communication. The 
lyrics acknowledge linguistic pluralism and de-territorialise the lingualscape. 
Co-consumption and co-production practices in the Sino-Korean musical 
television program both shape and are shaped by the intermingling; it 
is not so much a hybridity strategy but a fuzzy blurriness, refusing to be 
sublimated or translated and deconstructing any ethno- or national- centric 
interpretation. In the Chinese remake of the Korean show I Am a Singer, it 
would be hard to define a performance associated with either Chineseness 
or Koreanness. Hwang Ch’iyõl’s trilingual (Chinese, Korean, and English) 
performance of “Bang Bang Bang” in season four, for instance, took that 
week’s crown and received warm applause from the audience and music 
critics. Allkpop, a US-based Korean pop blog, reported this performance in 
which Hwang “stood on stage, decked out in a white tuxedo, and blew away 
the audience.”7 BNTNews commented that Hwang’s “deep and emotional 
voice” and “passionate dance” has made him “received enthusiastic reactions 
from the crowd”; “it is no exaggeration to say that Hwang brought ‘Hwang 
Chi Yeol fever’ in China,” and “Hwang is rising to stardom in China as one of 
the Hallyu celebrity.”8 Indeed, it was a sensation on Weibo and covered by 
China Daily, in which Hwang’s remake was compared to the original version 
sung by BIGBANG, which was, of course, itself recomposed from Teddy 
G-Dragon’s piece by Shin Seung-Ick.9 Besides the elements borrowed from 
Black musical conventions in the original song, Hwang’s performance also 
incorporated a prelude of music and movements from the James Bond film 
franchise’s iconic opening, Broadway style orchestration, Korean rap, and 
Chinese and English lyrics, not to mention the Korean and Chinese dancers, 
Hong Kong music director, and the live band made up of musicians from the 
United States, Hong Kong, Portugal, mainland China, Korea, and Australia, 
without whom Hwang’s performance would perhaps not have been received 
as it was. Although there could be a whole article’s worth of analysis only 
on the origins of the instruments, garments, makeup, props, and the mutual 
influence between them, each dimension’s intermingling increases the 
difficulty of defining the nationality or origin of this performance. 
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4. Korean words and names are romanised using the McCune-Reischauer system in this article (i.e. 
Hwang Ch'iyõl) unless they are quoted from other sources. Hwang Chi Yeol or Hwang Chi-yeol is 
the romanisation of the same name according to the Revised Romanisation of Korean.
5. “黃致列首張專輯銷量創 4 年來獨唱歌手新紀錄” (Huang Zhilie shouzhang zhuanji xiaoliang 
chuang 4 nian lai duchang geshou xin jilu, The sales of Hwang Ch’iyõl’s first album created a 
new record for all solo artists in last four years), Epoch Times, 29 December 2017, http://www.
epochtimes.com/gb/17/12/19/n9973146.htm (accessed on 12 July 2018).
6. “黃致列身價高漲 大陸演出費是韓國 100 倍” (Huang Zhilie shenjia gaozhang dalu yanchufei 
shi Hanguo 100 bei, Hwang Ch’iyõl’s price for performance soars, performance price in Mainland 
China is 100 times that in South Korea), Chinanews, 12 April 2016, http://ent.sina.com.cn/z/
y/2016-04-12/doc-ifxrcizu4036522.shtml (accessed on 12 July 2018).
7. Thekpopwriter, “Big Bang’s ‘Bang Bang Bang’ wins Hwang Chi Yeol 1st place on Chinese ‘I Am a 
Singer’,” allkpop, 6 February 2016, https://www.allkpop.com/article/2016/02/big-bangs-bang-
bang-bang-wins-hwang-chi-yeol-1st-place-on-chinese-i-am-a-singer (accessed on 20 July 2019).
8. “Hwang Chi Yeol Took the First Place on Chinese version of ‘I Am a Singer 4,’” BNTNews, 2 June 
2016, https://www.msn.com/en-my/news/other/hwang-chi-yeol-took-the-first-place-on-chinese-
version-of-%E2%80%98i-am-a-singer4%E2%80%99/ar-BBpbOPq (accessed on 20 July 2019).
9. “黃致列翻唱的 ‘Bang Bang Bang’ 水平如何?” (Huang Zhilie fanchang de “Bang Bang Bang” 
shuiping ruhe?, How is Hwang Ch’iyõl’s cover of “Bang Bang Bang”), China Daily, 3 March 2016, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/toutiaonew/53002523/2016-03-03/cd_23728446.html 
(accessed on 29 January 2018).
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The Deleuzian concept of collective assemblage is helpful here to 
understand the multiplicity in the musical performances, as well as in our 
daily life of de-territorialisation. As Deleuze and Guattari contend, “there is 
a collective assemblage of enunciation, a machinic assemblage of desire, 
one inside the other and both plugged into an immense outside that is a 
multiplicity in any case” (1987: 23). This music television program, either 
the Korean original or the Chinese remake, has been set up to be plugged 
into an “outside” in which multiplicity is the inevitable norm, reflecting 
a machinic assemblage of desire for multiplying and connecting outside. 
The pronunciation of the lyrics was less driven by phonetic accuracy and 
more mixed in a blurriness in which language barriers do not play any 
important role in connecting audiences. The most efficient part in terms 
of communication in the performance, however, is conveyed by the 
lyrics – “bang bang bang” – which are void of meaning outside of their 
onomatopoeic function. Nevertheless, the “bang bang bang” is meaningful 
in that it is carried out through visual modes of communication that abet 
de-territorialising the lingualscape. 
Language implies a certain structure or code (Bauman and Briggs 
2003; Makoni and Pennycook 2005). To acknowledge what Derrida calls 
the “untranslatable” is a post-structuralist escape from the “violence of 
representation” (Derrida 2000). Lie points out that even in music, the so-
called “universal language,” there still exists a “resistance to a foreign-
language lyric” (Lie 2012). Foreigners are the ones from a different culture 
speaking different languages. When one culture, in the course of engaging 
with another culture, requires the foreigner to speak the host language, 
the host culture performs violence as a host. This so-called hospitality is 
conditional; as Jacques Derrida suggests, it forces foreigners to be one of 
“us” and thus “violently erases the heterogeneity of others” (Derrida 2000). 
The uttering of the quasi-nonsense “bang bang bang” is both a foreigners’ 
revolt against violent conditional hospitality and the host’s open acceptance 
of the foreigners’ utterings. Language is not a transparent medium; rather, it 
is constructed, if not manipulated, by various intentions within the nation-
state apparatus. By both acknowledging human linguistic diversity and 
staying alert to the agenda of control through language, the uttering of the 
meaningless yet meaningful “bang bang bang” in Hwang’s performance 
opens a window of connecting audiences free of cohesive violence. Thus, I 
venture to propose that the de-territorialising lingualscape in the Sino-Korean 
engagement of musical TV shows is a reconstruction of a world order through 
nonofficial language – a new world order reimagined through the apparatus 
of screen, one that is decentred, eliminating barriers for communication and 
establishing visual relations through which audiences achieve a vernacular 
relationship to one another. It is an order in which affective qualities mediate 
the relationships between the audiences. The live and offscreen audiences are 
related and communicate with each other, experiencing affective interactions 
that traverse on- and offscreen environments. 
Relative to verbal dialogue, while music requires less translational 
intervention, the problem of translating lyrics remains nonetheless. In the 
musical program I Am a Singer, both The One and Hwang Ch’iyõl’s bilingual 
or trilingual songs were translated and subtitled for broadcasting. However, 
the 500 live audience members who actually voted on the contestants 
were not provided with any translation. Nevertheless, they rejoiced in the 
experience of sensorial immersion. The lack of translation apparently did not 
dampen their appreciation of the show. As his online fandom comments: 
“why this is a need to differentiate nationality” and “language doesn’t 
matter, just believe in your ears.”10 The Chinese audiences were able to greet 
the Korean performances with hospitality free of linguistic violence, and it 
is this hospitality that lies at the centre of empathetic feeling-togetherness. 
Only when hostility is removed can this feeling be cultivated. Although 
neoliberal economic interdependence in the global capitalist economy has 
been significantly shaping the cultural interactions between Korea and China, 
it would still be too presumptuous to reduce the complex relationships 
between nations and humans to the economy. As Lawrence Grossberg 
argues, “by assuming it is always and all about the economy (stupid!), it 
renders invisible other developments that are equally important and equally 
troubling” (2012: 59). The economy does not provide answers to everything. 
It is when the border-crossing exchanges occur in the general public’s 
everydayness that exchanges can be penetrative into each other culture’s 
milieu and so might possibilities for wholesome, reciprocal relationships 
emerge. I believe that the trivialities of everyday life for the general public 
was also on Sheldon H. Lu’s mind when he suggested that “postsocialism is 
everyday life” and “postsocialism pertains to perception and affects” (2007: 
209). This is not about grand ideologies or state-sanctioned narratives; rather, 
it is about the affect  of the interactions and negotiations in the general 
public’s everyday interactions. In the affect, true communication is possible. 
Echoing Grossberg, Appadurai’s “community of sentiment” (Appadurai 1990) 
is a group that begins “to imagine and feel things together, because of the 
condition of collective reading, criticism, and pleasure” (Apparudai 1996: 
8). Music has long been a medium for expressing people’s hidden longings, 
pouring out their emotions, and bearing their hopes. Transnational fandom 
is built on the shared affective experiences generated when watching the 
show, and reinforced further in intentional communities formed to express 
and share sorrow, joy, sadness, happiness, fury, and the dissatisfaction of 
partially understanding the multilingual lyrics. Such moments suggest an 
acknowledgement of linguistic pluralism and a playful mechanization in 
the form of entertainment. “Glossolalia” – speaking in tongues – (Heller-
Roazer 2014: 594) becomes a way to communicate in the individual domain 
through the co-consumption of collaborative screen culture, wherein 
standard official languages are absent. 
Language shapes thoughts, and thoughts guide actions. While officially 
sanctioned languages can be distorted by various prohibitions and 
proscriptions, singing through a hybridised language that is not officially 
constructed might perhaps create space for a new order within which 
official-sanctioned ideologies are deconstructed and sincere communication 
is possible. This is a process of building new order through language use 
that is mediated by the de-territorialising lingualscape based on visual and 
intuitive modes of communication. This lingualscape imagines a new ordering 
of various dimensions of language, culture, and ideology, and it reconstructs 
the ways that audiences speak, think, and act. The transnational musical TV 
program I Am a Singer enables both Chinese and Korean audiences to relate 
to each other and to project their affects, either positive or negative, on 
screen, thereby arousing their affective thinking of each other off screen. As 
Bliss Cua Lim raises, “the term market proximity refers to a close familiarity 
between one national-popular audience and another nation’s screen texts” 
(2009: 227). Beng Huat Chua also mentions that when the focus is on the 
urban space, Asian audiences more easily self-identify with Korean screen 
culture than with American screen culture (Chua 2004). To the audiences, 
the bodies of the celebrities become interchangeable bodies on screens, 
leading to an immersed experience. Consumers are geographically located 
in “cultural spaces” within which they bring their own cultural context to 
bear on the content of the imported product. As Chua contends, an audience 
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member is capable of “transcend(ing) his or her grounded nationality to 
forge abstract identification” (ibid .: 227). It is crucial that this abstract 
identification constructs communities of sentiment, and that in the process, 
audiences sing, view, read, feel, and communicate through a system of visual 
relations that crosses barriers. As Appadurai notes, “neighbourhoods are 
designed to be instances and exemplars of a generalised mode of belonging 
to a wider territorial imaginary.” Therefore, a transnational imagined 
community is potentially forming; as Appadurai writes, “neighbourhood as 
context produces the context of neighbourhoods” (1996: 191). A community 
of sentiment has been shaped by the amplified dynamics of unremitting de-
territorialisation where national culture has developed into a hybridised form.
Border-crossing interactions incite accompanying frictions, especially in the 
context of geographical proximity and cultural similarity. In the case of co-
consuming a musical TV show, community is built upon a shared affective 
experience, though it is important to note that affect does not necessarily 
suggest a utilitarian pleasurable experience. This is so not only because 
negative emotional qualities (presentation of pain, sorrow, and frustration) 
are involved in exchanges within the lingualscape, but also because these 
negative affects result from the fact that the nation-state is not obsolete. 
Official governmental political amity can always serve as the munificent 
prerequisite to the market interchange that is represented in television 
and other visual forms of cultural exchange between China and Korea. The 
Chinese remake of I Am a Singer triumphantly rolled out five seasons from 
2013 to 2016. Nevertheless, since the Chinese State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) placed a ban on Korean 
popular culture and Korean performers due to the US missile system Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in August 2016, the sixth season of I Am 
a Singer was forced to be renamed Singer, in order to take more distance from 
the original Korean version.11 Korean singers are no longer invited on the show. 
The state’s intervention on Hunan TV through surveillance and censorship 
also made casting more difficult. At the beginning of the sixth season, the 
program director Tao Hong burst into tears while giving his opening remarks. 
He choked with sobs as he said: “I tried my best. We really did our best to try 
to invite those singers you expected to come. This is all I can say.”12 The exact 
reason for this difficulty in casting is unknown, although it is clear from this 
incident that the affects delivered through the musical TV show are not only 
comprised of positive sentiments and optimistic indulgence. In 2019, Hwang 
Ch’iyõl’s comments about Chinese polluted air and poor-tasting water on 
the 23 January Korean MBC variety TV program Radio Star became the top 
search on Weibo, inciting a backlash among many in the Chinese audience. 
Hwang was accused of mocking China while being supported by his Chinese 
fans. It remains unclear whether this backlash was led by Chinese media 
that stirred up fury with malicious interpretation or resulted from, as Korean 
media claims, improper translation of Hwang’s words.13 Dissonant affects 
and thoughtful reflection can be raised. This controversy has brought in the 
issue of linguistic transaction wherein official language can be constructed 
or even manipulated by state-sanctioned intentions. The role of nation-state 
intervention is still a crucial question in transnational cultural exchanges. In 
his book Spreadable Media, Henry Jenkins raises this point:
The transnational circulation of media may be the most fragile, given 
the geopolitical and economic complexities of the situations we are 
discussing. However, we do believe that the informal spread of media 
content through networked communications may circumnavigate if 
not circumvent some of the factors (political, legal, economic, cultural) 
which have allowed U.S. mass media to maintain its dominance 
throughout much of the twentieth century (2013: 261).
Jenkins observes the fragility of the transnational circulation of media, 
and yet he still credits a great deal to the spreadability of commercial mass 
media, arguing that the role spreadable media has played is perhaps “the 
most powerful force in our collective cultural lives” (ibid.: 259). Hye-seung 
Chung and David S. Diffrient question this optimistic assumption based on 
media spreadability in Movie Migrations (2015). Nevertheless, I would like 
to proffer at this juncture that it is this very spreadability that allows access 
to one another across boundaries facilitated by the shifting lingualscape in 
the general public’s everyday lives. Lingualscape is proposed as a site where 
affective negotiation for communication rises above the violence of official 
languages rather than forthrightly fighting against it. Lingualscape functions 
as a negotiation instead of confrontation, as a torturous revolt within the 
state-sanctioned narratives. I Am a Singer, for instance, is still shaped by the 
hegemonic use of putonghua (普通話, Mandarin) while (re)semanticisation 
is communicated through alterative lingualscape. 
In “a potentially volatile policy environment”14 such as mainland China, 
accessibility is the first step towards being knowable and comprehensible. 
Just as hip hop has become highly politicised as a dominant music genre in 
the US, Chinese audiences also seek musical affective negotiation to project 
their longings, pour out their emotions, and merge into a transnational 
context, all without touching the political red line. While Childish Gambino’s 
This is America was awarded the Grammy Award for Song of the Year in 
2019, it is hard to imagine that something like This is China could even 
survive in the Chinese environment, let alone receive an industry-wide award. 
In fact, in order to integrate into the global musicscape, many countries 
rolled out their own version of This is America, one of which was indeed This 
is China. Nevertheless, the video only survived for three minutes on Weibo. 
Within this context, the original Korean musical TV program (with of course 
some politicised parts) provides a model for Chinese musical programs that 
is compatible with China’s transitioning identity and consumption patterns 
in the contemporary market economy. This practice of selective export 
in return helps the original Korean musical TV show itself be capable of 
connecting with or “plugging into” others’ cultural milieus. This incorporation 
has facilitated cultural de-territorialisation where shared life experiences 
and emotional qualities can flourish, creating regional musicscapes not 
dominated by US influence. 
In the case of the Chinese remake of I am a Singer , which is primarily 
Special feature
11. The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT, 2013-2018). It 
was named the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) from 1998 to 2013.
12. Tao Hong (dir.), Singer, in the episode broadcasted on 16 January 2018.
13. See for instance: “中國又被韓國明星‘羞辱’了? 網友評論却分成兩派” (Zhongguo you bei 
Hanguo mingxing “xiuru” le? Wangyou pinglun que fencheng liang pai, China has been “humiliated” 
by Korean stars again? Netizens’ comments are divided into two factions), Reference News, 25 
January 2019, https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2019-01-25/doc-ihqfskcp0418292.shtml (accessed 
on 15 July 2019); “黃致列為‘吐槽中國’道歉  韓電視臺: 只是翻譯的問題, 不需要道歉” 
(Huang Zhilie wei “tucao Zhongguo” daoqian Han dianshitai: Zhi shi fanyi de wenti, bu xuyao 
daoqian, Hwang Ch’iyõl apologizes for “mocking China,” Korean TV station: it’s just a translation 
problem, no need to apologise), Guancha Syndicate , 18 January 2019, http://www.guancha.cn/
internation/2019_01_28_488452.shtml (accessed on 15 July 2019); “황치열, ‘중국 공기 안 좋
아’ 발언 사과…’오해의 소지 있어” (Hwang Ch’iyõl, “chungguk konggi an choa parõn sagwa…” 
ohaeui soji issõ, Hwang Ch’iyõl apologises for his comments on “Chinese poor-quality air…” 
there is a misunderstanding), Star Tour, 26 January 2019, https://www.mk.co.kr/star/hot-issues/
view/2019/01/54526/ (accessed on 15 July 2019); and “After Hwang Chi-yeul’s apology, Korean 
media accuses Chinese netizens of cyberbullying,” DramaPanda, 28 January 2019, http://www.
dramapanda.com/2019/01/after-hwang-chi-yeuls-apology-korean.html (accessed on 17 July 
2019).
14. Brian Yecies calls the Chinese “a potentially volatile policy environment” through an observation of 
transnational collaboration in the Chinese film industry (2016: 236).
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watched on Chinese streaming websites instead of official television 
stations, the show provides Chinese audiences with an alternative way to 
enjoy everyday leisure across borders, generating a space within which 
Chinese audiences can watch and compare the original shows and Chinese 
remakes. Online discussions of these musical shows on Internet blogs 
have changed TV consumption from a linear practice into a multilingual, 
multidirectional, and interactive experience. In this process, the shifting 
lingualscape plays a significant role in facilitating audiences’ need for 
synchronicity and in removing language barriers within exchanges, 
resulting in the forging of a virtual transnational community of common 
ordinariness. This everydayness comes to fruition in the combination of 
musical television programs, where the shifting lingualscape of the lyrics 
transforms sung music into a universal language, and into television, which 
offers affordable and private leisure available at any time. Together, they 
reshape audiences’ everyday lives. 
New possibilities can only be made through new investments. New 
investments require a reimagining, including a contextualisation of all the 
multiplicities and alternatives and a turning away from making arbitrary 
conclusions and (re)producing binary extremes. One of the compelling 
consequences of hallyu  is that its global fandom has illuminated a 
transnational vision, one that opens new possibilities, while also abetting 
Koreans’ national pride and other nations’ resistance to nationalism. In an 
attempt to produce a new ideology under an inherited dichotomy, the result 
would merely be the reproduction of the old. In contrast, to question the 
state-sponsored narrative via the screen culture apparatus would be a more 
productive start. In the age of globalisation, one of the predominant themes 
in the Sino-Korean conjuncture is the tension between nationalism and 
transnationalism. The Chinese practice of importing or mimicking Korean 
TV programs and the backlash against the practice are forms of “resistance” 
and “affinity.” Particularly in a globalising China, the old ideologies and new 
commercial imperatives are at odds. The rapid growth of the new economy 
since the 1990s has undermined traditional and revolutionary ideologies, as a 
result of what Jason McGrath terms the radical transition “from heteronomy 
to autonomy” (McGrath 2008). At the moment of transition towards 
autonomy, Deborah S. Davis also points out that consumer patterns have 
changed at an interpersonal level in everyday sociability after the reform era 
in a more commodified and marketized China (Davis 2000). The autonomy 
of consumption was granted, while the post-revolutionary empty spaces of 
entertainment and the general publics’ leisure lives in China have yet to be 
filled. All-powerful capitalist consumerism and commercialism have challenged 
the revolutionary mentality and the socialist ideology among the general 
public. Media productions play a central role in this process. 
The Chinese remake of I Am a Singer, featuring Korean singers and their 
multilingual songs, helps to meet the need to blur linguistic boundaries. 
Such a practice is motivated by the dual purposes of producing a sensational 
TV show and diversifying the landscape of a performing stage in the 
globalised screen cultural arena. The collaborative media productions and 
co-consumption practices of this music television show among Chinese 
and Korean audiences suggest that common ground is possible. Traffic 
mediated by screen culture flows across barriers and boundaries in a fluid 
form of storytelling, within which the demand for collapsing lyrical barriers 
is correspondingly rising as a newly constructed aesthetic sensibility. The 
One and Hwang Ch’iyõl’s multilingual performances have reshaped the 
lingualscape of the program, satisfied audiences’ craving for crossing borders 
(as the new aesthetic demands), and reconfigured a new global order 
arranged around the everyday life experience of the general public.
Conclusion: Towards a be-coming community
New aesthetic modes arise and bond transnational consumers as is the 
case, for example, in musical TV programs. Even so, it would be too hasty 
to draw a conclusion about cosmopolitan pop. Like the anti-Korean wave 
fomented by the Chinese state, the invention of the nation-state is deeply 
linked with cultural interactions, including the de-territorialising lingualscape. 
Youngmin Choe argues that being distracted from nation-state sponsored 
narratives could be a “productive distraction” (2016). Derrida likewise 
questions the validity of “hospitality” towards foreigners as a host (2000), 
and as Appadurai argues, culturalism inherently involves ethnic violence, or 
“identity politics mobilised at the level of the nation-state” (1996: 15). The 
ability to be hospitable lies in the ability to be the host. This identity of host 
is granted by the government. Thus, in order to maintain being a host, there 
are responsibilities that need to be fulfilled, such as obeying governmental 
surveillance and communication via official languages. Paradoxically, the 
state’s intervention becomes the precondition for being a host, although the 
responsibility of hosting requires that hospitality be offered, sometimes in 
violation of the state’s requirements. In this sense, a genuine “face to face 
encounter,” to borrow Emmanuel Levinas’s term (1985), would make it 
difficult to maintain a reality where violence is perpetuated.
The invention of the third party, the state, not only in the form of 
intervention and surveillance, but also in the language system it constructs 
for the purposes of propaganda under the veil of national identification, 
has destroyed the primal and purist ethical relationship between the Other 
and the self. Giorgio Agamben’s insights shed light on the ontological basis 
of friendship by drawing on Aristotle’s theory that friends “share the same 
sweetness of existing” (2006: 33). This affective experience, this feeling 
together, leads people toward (re)constructing a community with the future 
in mind. The shared experience of co-sensing the music, sound, lights, and 
images in the same TV programs on screen fosters richer understandings 
across cultures. All these visual modes help to build a system of visual 
relations in which spectators are able to relate to each other across borders. 
The musical show I Am a Singer allows local audiences to identify themselves 
and offers them a comparative perspective that permits audiences to 
“speak” to each other, albeit not in standardised official languages. This 
provides a channel for an empathetic appreciation of the other. The shifting 
lingualscape is an imagination not of a common language, but of powerful 
multiplicities. It is a reimagination of the general public speaking in tongues 
to shake off the ideological and structural shackles of the state-sanctioned 
language system. 
Achieving this community is also related to Levinas’s “serving to the 
other,” wherein one feels compelled to get to know the “other” culture 
(1985). In Lawrence Grossberg’s words, getting to know the other would 
be an ethical responsibility that needs to be fulfilled. He argues that ethical 
commitment is to the other, to belonging together with the other. As he 
puts it, “my own ethical sense is constituted as an obligation to an other (…) 
the other is what can only be imagined – as a coming community (…) it is 
there that ethics and politics, practice and desire, meet” (2010: 100). The (re)
construction of this transnational be-coming of community has been shaped 
by the dynamics of both division and integration. Thus, it would be more 
pragmatic to frame discourse about this be-coming community in a future 
tense. In East Asia, this be-coming community is relevant to Choe’s proposal 
of Asianisation in terms of feeling together in an “affect community.” Choe 
argues for a “self-reflective perspective for viewing the complexities – its 
anxieties, tensions, and celebratory gestures – of a new East Asian affective 
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economy” (2016: 7). This affective economy requires us to resituate the 
co-productions and remakes within East Asia in a more affective sense in 
terms of feeling together. Choe further points out that the “exchange of 
products and capital [is in] a sense of what Giorgio Agamben refers to as 
the ‘con-sent’ at the heart of friendship” (ibid.). In the East Asian affective 
being-togetherness, this “con-sent” is not only embodied by increasingly 
interdependent economic engagement, but is also embedded in the rising 
regional cultural identity and co-consumption of popular culture as a shared 
experience and feeling in the everyday life and trivialities of the general 
public. 
Both Korean and Chinese audiences across borders share affective 
experiences because of the transnational co-productions and remakes that 
mediate collective affects. These collective affects portray transnational 
relations through a relatively de-politicalised form of entertainment. Both 
the original and the remake seek intertexual survival in the land of each 
other’s “brotherhood,” where linguistic pluralism and political tension are 
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